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Forced migration changes people’s lives and their sense of self-continuity fundamentally.
One memory-based mechanism to protect the sense of self-continuity and
psychological well-being is autobiographical meaning making, enabling individuals to
explain change in personality and life by connecting personal experiences and other
distant parts of life to the self and its development. Aiming to replicate and extend prior
research, the current study investigated whether autobiographical meaning making has
the potential to support the sense of self-continuity in refugees. We therefore collected
life narratives from 31 refugees that were coded for autobiographical reasoning, selfevent connections, and global narrative coherence. In line with prior research, results
suggest that autobiographical meaning making relates to a higher sense of selfcontinuity and less psychological distress. Yet, if refugees experienced many continuing
postdisplacement stressors in addition to their forced displacement, autobiographical
meaning making was associated with higher self-discontinuity and greater psychological
distress, especially with trauma-related symptoms such as memory intrusion and
hyperarousal. Altogether, results indicate that autobiographical meaning making helps
to compensate the effects of extreme biographical disruptions on the sense of selfcontinuity, as long as the stress caused by the biographical change is not overwhelming
or too protracted.
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INTRODUCTION
Forced migration is an ongoing challenge for societies in many regions of the world. According
to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees [UNHCR] (2020), 79.5 million people, i.e., about 1% of the world population, were
forcibly displaced at the end of 2019. Becoming a refugee instigates numerous psychological
problems (Ullmann et al., 2015), as forced migration is mainly a process of losses. Individuals
who are forced to leave their home country lose their homeland, their community, their family
and friends, their language, their culture, and their physical safety (Carta et al., 2005). Thus,
forced migration might be one of the greatest biographical disruptions people can face. Amid
these drastic changes, refugees are challenged to preserve or regain their sense of self-continuity,
protecting their psychological well-being. Inspired by prior research showing that autobiographical
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Hence, refugees and migrants perceive a sharp dissimilarity
between their past and present life (Shi and Brown, 2016) and
show, discontinuous sense of self when remembering their past
(Gemignani, 2011; Oguz, 2012; Puvimanasinghe et al., 2015;
Witney and Bates, 2016).
In times of biographical disruptions, it needs the conscious
reflection of the past to reestablish a retrospective sense of
self-continuity (Bluck and Liao, 2013). The conscious reflection
of the past is the active effort to create a coherent life story
and to engage in effortful autobiographical meaning making
in order to explain and negotiate personal changes (Ricoeur,
1992; Bluck and Liao, 2013; Habermas and Köber, 2015b).
Going beyond mere remembering of the past, autobiographical
meaning making requires the deliberate reflection of past life
events and to extract personal meaning from past experiences
in order to yield a coherent account of identity in time
(Staudinger, 2001; D’Argembeau et al., 2014; Lavallee et al.,
2019). Because this study focuses on the conscious reflection
of the past, autobiographical meaning making and its effects
on self-continuity and psychological distress are described in
greater detail below.

meaning making buffers the impact of negative life events on
the sense of self-continuity (Habermas and Köber, 2015a), the
current study investigated whether autobiographical meaning
making has the potential to support the sense of self-continuity
in extreme circumstances such as forced migration.

THE SENSE OF SELF-CONTINUITY AND
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY
The pre-reflective sense of self-continuity provides a person
with the feeling to be the same and continuous over time
(Erikson, 1968). A disturbed sense of self-continuity is the
feeling that an individual cannot relate to his or her former
self anymore, sometimes perceived as estrangement from,
and lacking sense of ownership of one’s body, thoughts,
and feelings. While a disturbed sense of self-continuity can
be a chronic symptom in personality disorders (Kernberg,
1984), healthy personalities can also temporarily experience
a disturbed sense of self-continuity in times of change and
stress, which can be challenging for the identity (Habermas and
Köber, 2015b; Jiang et al., 2020). In such times, individuals
are motivated to repair and regain their sense of selfcontinuity (Erikson, 1968) and often do so by employing
their autobiographical memories (Bluck, 2003; Bluck and Liao,
2013). Research on autobiographical memory suggests two
main mechanisms to support the sense of self-continuity:
remembering the past and consciously reflecting the past
(Bluck and Liao, 2013).
Remembering the past is to immerse in nostalgic memories,
creating an emotional, sometimes wistful, connection between
the past and the remembering individual (Sedikides et al., 2008;
Prebble et al., 2013). Such remembering relies on the discrete
recall of specific events, images, sensations, or feelings of one’s
past and does not involve conscious reflection of one’s life
story. As voluntary or involuntary memories come to mind,
they provide the self with the sense of existing over time
and thus provide a basic sense of chronological self-continuity
(Bluck and Liao, 2013). A recent study showed that nostalgic
remembering increases the sense of self-continuity in refugees,
especially in those with higher levels of resilience (Wildschut
et al., 2019). If, however, the contrast between present and
past life is so stark that self-continuity is profoundly disturbed,
nostalgic remembering falls short in repairing the sense of
self-continuity as it tends to intensify the awareness of the
cherished but irrecoverable past and thus damages well-being
(Iyer and Jetten, 2011).
Profound disturbances of the sense of self-continuity result
from tragic negative events such as a sudden loss of close
others (Bauer and Bonanno, 2001), body parts or substantial
health (Hinojosa et al., 2008; Uzer and Brown, 2015), or
major roles due to job loss or retirement (Nuttman-Shwartz,
2008). Because such drastic changes put past and present
life in stark contrast to each other, they might be labeled
biographical disruptions or biographical ruptures. Forced
displacement certainly counts as biographical disruption as
it entails profound changes and losses (Carta et al., 2005).
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AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEANING
MAKING RELATES TO
SELF-CONTINUITY AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTRESS
In life narratives covering the entire life span, many different
life events are expected to be included and to be related to
other parts of life and to the narrator’s personality development
up to the present. Therefore, life narratives require global
narrative coherence in order to convey personal identity in
a comprehensible manner. Overarching global coherence
of life narratives has been conceptualized in three major
kinds of textual coherence: temporal, causal–motivational,
and thematic coherence (Habermas and Bluck, 2000). Global
temporal coherence refers to the temporal organization
of events and the elaboration of beginnings and endings
(Köber and Habermas, 2017). Global causal–motivational
coherence captures the narrator’s explanations of causes,
motivations, and consequences of past events and actions for
the personal life course and development. Global thematic
coherence concerns dominant life themes, which might
emerge throughout the narrative as different parts of life and
of the narrator’s personality match in similarity of themes
(Köber et al., 2015).
Within a life narrative, global narrative coherence results
from linking events to the narrator’s personality, portraying
how one event caused other events or how motives led to
actions producing consequences beyond the boundaries of
local events. This conscious reflection on life events from
a broader biographical perspective is termed autobiographical
reasoning, which involves the use of autobiographical arguments.
Autobiographical arguments explain change and stability in
personality and life by connecting personal experiences and
other distant parts of life to the self and its development
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reasoning (hypothesis 2b), and positive self-event connections
(hypothesis 2c).

(Habermas, 2011). Hence, autobiographical reasoning is a
powerful memory-based mechanism to create a coherent life
story and a coherent sense of self because it explains both
enduring change and stability in the self by reference to life events
(Köber et al., 2015).
One specific form of autobiographical arguments is selfevent connections, which are defined as explicit statements
that link personal experiences to an enduring aspect of self
(Pasupathi et al., 2007). Through self-event connections, past
life events can be related to personality dispositions, current
values, current perspectives about the world or self in general,
personal growth, and important relationships informing the
sense of self (Merrill et al., 2016). Thus, while other forms
of autobiographical arguments rather explain enduring change
and personality development, self-event connections tend to
emphasize enduring aspects of the self. In contrast to other
autobiographical arguments, which are mainly explanatory, selfevent connections can be positive or negative in their content as
individuals evaluate life events and the impact certain life events
may have had on enduring aspects of their self. Positive selfevent connections appreciate the past or the current self, whereas
negative self-event connections disapprove the past or the current
self (Merrill et al., 2016).
Autobiographical meaning making, that is, crafting coherent
autobiographical accounts, autobiographical reasoning, and
creating self-event connections, has been found to be protective
for the sense of personal identity and psychological wellbeing amid and past negative life events. In a study with
Belgian undergraduate students, narrative coherence appeared
to safeguard against the psychological distress caused by
academic failure, at least in the short term (Vanderveren
et al., 2020). Furthermore, in a German non-clinical sample,
autobiographical reasoning has been found to buffer the
impairing effect of negative events on the sense of self-continuity.
This effect, however, was only observed in individuals who
had experienced biographical disruptions such as relocation,
illness, or death prior to the study (Habermas and Köber,
2015a). Apparently, the sense of self-continuity is reduced only
in times of biographical ruptures, but can be reestablished by
conscious autobiographical meaning making. Similarly, positive
self-event connections seem to shield against psychological
distress and to strengthen the sense of identity when processing
negative or traumatic life events in personal narratives.
Negative self-event connections, in contrast, impair the sense of
identity and psychological well-being (Banks and Salmon, 2013;
Merrill et al., 2016).
Seeking to replicate and extend these prior results, this
study investigated whether autobiographical meaning making
compensates for the adverse effects of forced migration on
the sense of self-continuity (hypothesis 1) and psychological
distress (hypothesis 2). We hypothesized that this compensating
effect would show as negative correlations of the sense of
self-discontinuity with narrative coherence (hypothesis 1a),
autobiographical reasoning (hypothesis 1b), and positive selfevent connections (hypothesis 1c). Similarly, we hypothesized
that the level of psychological distress correlates negatively
with narrative coherence (hypothesis 2a), autobiographical
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
In total, 32 individuals were recruited to participate in this
study. However, the data collection of one participant failed
due to technical problems. Therefore, the sample presented
here consists in total of 31 participants, including one female.
Data collection took place in Germany between May and
July 2015 when the European “refugee crisis” was underway
(Triandafyllidou, 2018). Participants ranged in age from 19 to
58 years (M = 31.39; SD = 9.91) and came mostly from countries
such as Eritrea, Ghana, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Togo, and Syria.
Almost half of the sample (48.40%) had finished high school,
29.00% had completed university, and the remaining 22.60% had
elementary or no school education. Main reasons for fleeing
their country were war, forced military service, poverty, and
political or religious persecution. On average, refugees had been
in Germany for 18.45 months (range 8–43 months). About
half of the participants (N = 16) were accommodated in a
refugee camp in Germany, while the 15 remaining participants
stayed in apartments or in church asylum in a bigger German
city. Several of those who were not living in institutional
accommodation were at times homeless before obtaining other
forms of accommodation. Although participants were officially
recognized as refugees by the European Union (38.70%) or
by Germany (61.30%), the majority (61.30%) had not obtained
the right for unlimited residence in Germany, keeping them in
uncertainty about their future.

Procedure
Participants were recruited with the help of a research assistant,
who volunteered in a refugee camp, and by word of mouth
among the refugee community. This study was approved by the
Research Ethics Committee of Fachbereich 05 Psychologie und
Sportwissenschaften of the Department of Psychology, Goethe
University Frankfurt (#2015-127) on March 17, 2015.
Following consent, participants first told their life narrative
and then completed several questionnaires. All interviews were
conducted in English and took place in the university or in
a silent room in the refugee camp. Interview sessions lasted
between 1 and 1.5 h for which participants were compensated
with 20 Euros.

Materials
Life Narratives
Before providing the life narrative, participants named
their seven most important memories and brought them in
chronological order. This served to familiarize participants
with the concept of telling their life story and ensured that life
narratives comprised specific events. Participants were asked to
narrate their life for about 25 min without being interrupted.
They were instructed to include the seven most important
memories and to tell their life such as to explain how they
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had become the person they were at present. Interviewers only
encouraged to continue but asked no questions.

Sense of Self-Discontinuity
Following Habermas and Köber (2015a), we measured the
inversed sense of self-continuity, that of self-discontinuity.
Participants reflected their feeling of familiarity with themselves
in the past when they were still living in their home country. The
four items were “I can still relate to the kind of person I was and to
how I felt before I left my country” (inverted); “When I think back
to how I was before I left my country, it feels a little unfamiliar”;
“When I look at pictures of myself before I left my country, it feels
a little unfamiliar”; and “I have the feeling that at the core I am the
same person I was before I left my country” (inverted). Responses
were scaled from 1 “not true at all” to 6 “absolutely true.” Internal
consistency was good with Cronbach’s α = 0.72.

Questionnaires
Following the narration of their lives, participants completed
several questionnaires. We measured the general psychological
distress with the Brief Symptom Inventory (Derogatis and
Melisaratos, 1983), the specific psychological distress related
to the flight from the home country with the revised Impact
of Event Scale (IES-R, Weiss, 2007), the objective change
in life that took place since their flight, and their sense of
self-discontinuity.

The Brief Symptom Inventory

Narrative Coding

The Brief Symptom Inventory (Derogatis and Melisaratos, 1983)
measures a range of psychological symptomatology such as
somatization, depression, hostility, anxiety, paranoia, phobias,
and obsessive compulsive tendencies. Combining the numbers
of psychological symptoms and the intensity of the perceived
stress, the Global Severity Index measures the general distress
and is thus the single best indicator of distress levels currently
experienced by the individual. Internal consistency was high,
Cronbach’s α = 0.91.

Life narratives were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim.
The first author, trained in a former study (Köber et al.,
2015), divided life narratives into propositions, that is, into
comprehensible main or subordinate clauses. Then, the first
author trained four research assistants in applying the coding
schemes of global narrative coherence, autobiographical
reasoning, and self-event connections. Two research assistants
coded autobiographical reasoning. The second author coded
self-event connections in collaboration with the first author
and, 6 months later, global narrative coherence with another
research assistant. All research assistants were blind to the
hypotheses of the study. To establish reliability between
coders, two coders first independently coded 15 life narratives,
which were then compared by means of Cohen’s kappa (κ)
or intraclass correlation (rIC ). Once the coders established
substantial independent agreement (κ or rIC > 0.70), both coders
independently coded the remaining life narratives. All coder
disagreements were resolved through consensus in discussion
with the first author.

The Impact of Event Scale
The revised version of the Impact of Event Scale (IES-R; Weiss,
2007) was used to measure participants’ traumatic stress in
relation to the experience of the flight. Three subscales measure
intrusion, avoidance, and hyperarousal, which are typical
symptomatic responses following exposure to traumatic life
events. Intrusion is characterized by nightmares or involuntary
memory flashbacks; avoidance is the more or less conscious effort
to not think or talk about the traumatic event; and hyperarousal
is described by anger, irritability, trouble concentrating, and
hypervigilance. We used the IES-R to measure on a 5-point Likert
scale (0 = not at all to 4 = extremely) the intensity with which
participants experienced in the last 7 days such symptoms with
specific respect to their flight. Internal consistency was high,
Cronbach’s α = 0.89.

Global Coherence of Life Narratives
Three 7-point scales were used to rate the three kinds of
global coherence of life narratives from the recipient’s point
of view. The scale for temporal coherence measures how well
the reader is temporally oriented. Lower values (1–2) were
assigned when it remained unclear when and in what order life
events occurred, whereas higher values (6–7) were given when
the temporal order was consistently intelligible throughout the
life narrative. Interrater reliability was rIC = 0.99. The scale
for causal–motivational coherence assesses how well a sense
of the developmental significance of events is conveyed. Life
narratives received lower values (1–2) when no development
of the personality became clear and higher values (6–7) when
the development of the personality became clear in its turning
points and motives. Interrater reliability was rIC = 0.98. The
scale for thematic coherence measures how thematically coherent
the life narrative is. Lower values (1–2) were assigned to life
narratives when no or only one theme was addressed, whereas life
narratives in which heterogeneous episodes or different areas of
life (e.g., private and working life) were connected in a logical and
comprehensible fashion received higher values (6–7). Interrater
reliability was rIC = 0.88.

Objective Change in Life
Using the scale employed by Habermas and Köber (2015a),
we measured how much objective life circumstances had
changed in the participants’ lives since they left their country.
Thus, this scale assessed continuous stressors that protract the
initial stress caused by the flight. Given the life circumstance
of the participants, we slightly adapted the scale and asked
for absolute frequencies of disruptive life events following
their flight: loss of or separation from partner, beginning
of new love relationship, loss or gain of friends, severe
illness or death in close persons, and moving residencies
within Germany. The scale ranged from 1 (never) and 2
(once) to 5 (four times) and 6 (more than four times).
Due to the heterogeneity of items, internal consistency was
moderate, Cronbach’s α = 0.64. Because events differed
in severity and frequency, we z-standardized each item
before averaging them.
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Interrater reliability was good with Cohen’s κ = 0.79. In addition,
we coded change-engendering self-event connections and
stability-maintaining self-event connections. While changeengendering self-event connections explain perceived change in
personality by specific life events, stability-maintaining self-event
connections support stability of personality by describing an
event or action as typical or, if contradicting personality, as

Autobiographical Reasoning
Life narratives were coded for specific autobiographical
arguments, constituting autobiographical reasoning. In line with
prior research (Habermas and Köber, 2015a; Köber et al., 2015),
we coded six autobiographical arguments: developmental status,
biographical background, lesson learned, generalized insights,
formative experience, turning points (see Table 1 for examples).

TABLE 1 | Excerpts of refugees’ life narratives with coding of autobiographical reasoning and self-event connections.
Autobiographical Arguments
Developmental status

But in Africa it’s so difficult life, in Eritrea, when I was 16 years old the government of Eritrea used power or force to
make me soldier, I said to him “Why? I am young ’til now, give me to, chance to learn or something.”

Biographical background

I cannot forget my friends that dead in the uh Mediterranean Sea, because I can see by my eye, when they are crying,
when they are, uh, they are sinking in the Mediterranean Sea and (-) that’s why I am always sad now but what can I do?

Generalized insights

In my country there is no freedom, there is no, um, uh, human right, so you have to, you want to escape or you want to
get out from the country because, uh, life is very short half my life is over, up to now not seeing the good life, that’s why
I left my country, to find the good life.

Lesson learned

I meet people where they are teaching me German language but could you say, uh, you have, uh, a close relation? You
couldn’t say, I think. It is very difficult for me because there is, there are many things hidden (-) which they don’t want to
say. So I realized what I need is not only German, but also to integrate and (-) making good relation with Germans.

Formative experience

My parents were forced to move out of the house, My father and my mother were arguing about moving to another
place, because that neighborhood was not well suited for a family, it’s like slums and there are a lot of other a, uh, other
things that influence raising a child. So we moved to that place and yeah until I left Eritrea we lived there.
So this event affected my life, I decided to uh to be careful about the situation,
not to pollute myself, not to spoil myself by the surrounding. So I was like uh isolating myself from the neighborhood, uh
because I felt that the area is not good for me.

Turning points

Then my mother bec’, she became sick. She, she, she, suffered from cancer, yeah, lung cancer, yeah. And then I
thought “No, she cannot die.”
I stop everything, to work, to pray, I’m completely out of life, long time like this, I’m suffering with her.
Change-engendering self-event connections

Event explains change in
personality

This is the first time me living alone, cooking for myself, cleaning up after myself and it’s a challenge, it’s a good, the first
time I came here I couldn’t even cook an egg (-) I was, I was so lazy, my mother would cook for me, I didn’t have to do
anything, I just had to go to school and (-) you know, living a normal kid’s life until all the situation that occurred (-) but
even though, uhm, it has made, it has made me a better person I believe, living alone has taught me a lot of things.

Event reveals unknown
personality aspects

I wasn’t afraid of the situation what happened but I just, it just completely hit me that many people go through this
everyday, and it’s not like an easy situation when you get arrested. There are also people being killed, you know,
abducted in the middle of the night they would just break into your house and take the people.
And at that moment there wasn’t fear inside me because I realized that I was fighting for some cause, you know. And at
that moment I just realized that I was fighting for something and that I, that the society was with me and
that was really empowering, you know, I was really empowered.
Self-event connections maintaining stability

Typical event explains
personality

Like my father, he and I, we are lover of the land, and we be (-) when this this was really happiness for me and my life
when we came back from Pakistan to our country, Afghanistan.

Atypical event contradicts
personality

I am, I am very strong, you know, I used to be very strong, so when I think that I beg here, that I, I don’t have any
solution for my life, it’s disturbing me a lot, it’s not like me.
Self-event connections

Valence

Personality dispositions

I have to be strong, disciplined, I have to be the role model for my younger brothers.

Neutral

Current values, beliefs
about right or wrong

And once in my life I start again to fight for (–) fight against the government, and to bring peace, I was fighting for better
life, to bring peace to my family and the world.

Negative

Current perspectives on the
world or self

But I ask always in my mind, why don’t they [the German immigration office] call me to have some information and to
have some interview, that’s why I am confused with my life and myself. Am I the person, (—) maybe it’s clear, the person
who I am?

Negative

Personal growth

Then both of us uh decided to uhm getting divorce (-), and uh yeah, the year, uh, and, and after that I uh
I tried to live uh, you know, by myself, independently from my parents or from anyone, I want to,
I wanted to be good as a one person, not as a couple, and then I tried to build my life, you know, rebuild my life again.

Positive

Important relationships

I left my country with a lot of hopes, to have work, for a good life (–) for my family, with my wife, my sons, I love my sons,
I love my wife.

Positive
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0.077
−0.127
IES –
Hyperarousal

N = 31. BSI, Brief Symptom Inventory measuring general psychological distress; IES, Impact of Event Scale measuring specific (flight-related) psychological distress. **p (one-tailed) < 0.05, *p (one-tailed) < 0.10.

0.183

0.221**
0.168
−0.248**
−0.058
-0.117
0.068

0.005

0.389**

0.127

0.129

0.164
−0.209*

−0.308**
−0.045

−0.124
-0.126

-0.204*
0.000

-0.063

−0.005

0.122
−0.029

−0.124
IES–Avoidance

0.241*

−0.026
IES–Intrusion

0.404**

−0.029

0.407**
0.059
0.009
0.063
0.185*
0.185*
0.122
−0.052
Psychological
distress

BSI–Global
Severity Index

0.261**

0.304**

0.049
0.027
0.033
-0.050
0.021
−0.007
0.027
—-

−0.275**
0.192*
−0.126
-0.069
-0.140

Positive

−0.067

−0.241**

Autobiographical
reasoning
Thematic
coherence
Causal– motivational
coherence

0.174+
—-

—Sense of
self-discontinuity

The sense of self-discontinuity tended to correlate with objective
change in life (Kendall’s τ = 0.174, p < 0.10; Table 2), supporting
the notion that biographical change disturbs the continuous
sense of self. However, opposing hypothesis 1, the sense of
self-discontinuity did not correlate with narrative coherence
(hypothesis 1a), autobiographical reasoning (hypothesis 1b),
or positive self-event connections (hypothesis 1c). Instead,

Objective change
in life

Autobiographical Meaning Making and
the Sense of Self-Continuity

Selfdiscontinuity

The number of all autobiographical arguments including changeengendering and stability-maintaining self-event connections
was divided by the total number of propositions per life narrative,
yielding the relative frequency of autobiographical arguments.
Similarly, the relative frequency of all self-event connections and
the proportion separated by their valence was calculated. Because
of our directed hypotheses, the small sample size, and some
non-normally distributed variables, one-tailed non-parametric
correlations were calculated. More specifically, we relied on
Kendall’s tau for testing our hypothesis because it is a rigorous
estimate for smaller sample sizes (Howell, 1992). We first
report the results on autobiographical meaning making and the
sense of self-continuity (hypothesis 1) and second describe the
findings on autobiographical meaning making and psychological
distress (hypothesis 2).

Temporal
coherence

Preliminary Analyses

Sense of selfdiscontinuity

RESULTS

Objective
change in life

TABLE 2 | Kendall’s tau coefficients for relations between objective change in life, the sense of self-discontinuity, autobiographical meaning making, and psychological distress.

Following prior research (Merrill et al., 2016), an additional
set of self-event connections were coded as any statements
where participants explicitly linked a life event to their enduring
sense of self. Capturing thus a rather stable view on the self,
these coded self-event connections included the connection of
life events to personality dispositions, current values, current
perspectives about the world or self in general, personal growth,
and important relationships informing the sense of self (see
Table 1 for examples). Interrater reliability was moderate with
Cohen’s κ = 0.70. Furthermore, these self-event connections
were subcoded for valence, that is, as positive, negative, or
neutral according to how the narrator appeared to view the
connection in context (Banks and Salmon, 2013). As displayed
in Table 1, self-event connections were coded as positive when
the statement referred to a positive characteristic of the self,
mentioned personal growth, or denoted a positive evaluation
of the self. Self-event connections were coded as negative when
the statement referenced a negative characteristic of the self or
denoted a negative evaluation of the self. Self-event connections
were coded as neutral when there was no evaluation of the self
or the connection was not clearly positive or negative. Interrater
reliability for the valence of self-event connection was very good
with Cohen’s κ = 0.91.

Total

Self-event connections

Self-Event Connections

Negative

Neutral

atypical (Pasupathi et al., 2007). Interrater reliability was good
with Cohen’s κ = 0.75.

0.219+
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TABLE 3 | Mean, standard deviation, and range of narrative and questionnaire measures.
Total Sample (N = 31)
M

Min.

SD

Group with less change in life (N = 16)
Max.

M

SD

Min.

Group with more change in life (N = 15)

Max.

M

SD

Min.

Max.

Narrative Measures
Temporal coherence

4.23

1.73

1.00

7.00

4.50

1.93

1.00

7.00

3.93

1.49

1.00

6.00

Causal–motivational coherence

2.74

1.48

1.00

6.00

3.19

1.42

1.00

5.00

2.27

1.44

1.00

6.00

Thematic coherence

2.81

1.01

1.00

6.00

3.00

1.16

2.00

6.00

2.60

0.83

1.00

4.00

Autobiographical reasoning (relative frequency)

1.47

1.75

0.00

7.00

1.38

1.42

0.10

5.00

1.57

2.10

0.00

7.00

Self-event connections (relative frequency)
7

3.29

3.12

0.00

16.40

3.38

2.03

0.00

8.20

3.19

4.05

0.00

16.40

Positive (in% of total)

50.10

30.09

0.00

100.00

47.47

26.76

0.00

90.90

52.91

34.01

0.00

100.00

Negative (in% of total)

31.83

25.53

0.00

100.00

37.61

22.75

0.00

76.20

35.01

26.64

8.30

100.00

8.39

12.64

0.00

50.00

8.68

13.42

0.00

50.00

8.07

12.21

0.00

33.30

Neutral (in% of total)

Questionnaire Measures
Objective Change in Life (z-standardized)
Sense of self-discontinuity

−0.01

0.41

−0.78

0.78

−0.33

0.27

−0.78

0.01

0.33

0.21

0.03

0.78

3.66

1.28

1.50

6.00

3.52

1.41

1.50

6.00

3.82

1.16

1.75

5.50

BSI–Global Severity Index

0.77

0.58

0.00

2.56

0.77

0.57

0.00

1.83

0.77

0.61

0.04

2.56

IES–Intrusion

1.98

0.99

0.50

3.63

1.83

0.92

0.50

3.50

2.10

1.08

0.50

3.63

IES–Avoidance

1.78

0.95

0.14

3.71

1.85

1.14

0.14

3.71

1.73

0.81

0.63

3.25

IES–Hyperarousal

1.72

1.14

0.17

4.00

1.80

1.29

0.17

4.00

1.64

1.06

0.50

3.33
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N = 16. BSI, Brief Symptom Inventory measuring general psychological distress; IES, Impact of Event Scale measuring specific (flight-related) psychological distress. **p (one-tailed) < 0.05. *p (one-tailed) < 0.10.

0.406

0.464*
0.138

0.315

−0.395

−0.568*

0.138

0.449*

−0.023

−0.067
0.298

0.305
0.049

0.097
0.105

−0.108

−0.244
IES–Hyperarousal

0.386

−0.250
IES–Avoidance

0.442*

0.558**

0.119
0.225
−0.296
0.360
−0.244
0.348
0.290
−0.333

0.000

0.243

IES–Intrusion

0.205

0.218
−0.303
−0.008
0.101
0.259
0.148
−0.050
BSI–Global Severity Index

0.322*

0.227

−0.034

−0.185
0.420**

−0.085

0.025

−0.187

0.017

0.192
−0.222

−0.045
0.203

0.206
−
Sense of self-discontinuity

0.254
−
Objective change in life

−

0.080

−0.358*

Negative
Positive
Total

Self-event connections
Autobiographical
reasoning
Thematic
coherence
Causal–
motivational
coherence
Temporal
coherence
Sense of selfdiscontinuity
Objective
change in life

TABLE 4 | Kendall’s tau coefficients for relations between objective change in life, the sense of self-discontinuity, autobiographical meaning making, and psychological distress for the group who experienced less
objective change in life.

objective change in life correlated negatively with global causal–
motivational coherence of life narratives (Kendall’s τ = −0.241,
p < 0.05; Table 2) and with negative self-event connections
(Kendall’s τ = −0.275, p < 0.05; Table 2). This result
indicates that the more life had changed, the less causal–
motivationally coherent refugees depicted their life narratives
and the more they narrated enduring aspects of the self in
negative terms. This might hint at some difficulties to integrate
the change that was caused by their flight into the broader
autobiographical context. Those refugees who experienced
greater changes in life since they fled their home country
managed less well to explain how they had become the person
they were at present.
This result supports prior research that narrating change
in life requires increased cognitive effort on autobiographical
meaning making in order to render life stories coherent
(Grysman and Hudson, 2010; Enz and Talarico, 2016). In other
words, whether autobiographical meaning making is instigated
to ensure the sense of self-continuity might depend on the
amount of change in life. We therefore followed the procedure
by Habermas and Köber (2015a) and divided our sample
into two groups, thereby accounting for their differences in
experienced objective change in life. We used the median of
objective change in life (Mdn = 0.003) to split the participants
in a group with less change in life (N = 16) and a group
with more change in life (N = 15). Both groups did not
differ significantly in their autobiographical meaning making
or psychological distress (Table 3), as controlled for by nonparametric tests.
The correlations of the participants who experienced less
change in life are displayed in Table 4. Objective change in
life correlated positively with positive self-event connections
(Kendall’s τ = 0.420, p < 0.05; Table 4). Apparently, the
greater the change in life was since these participants left
their home country, the more positive aspects they note
in their personality, values, perspectives on the world, or
relationships. However, neither the amount of positive self-event
connection nor narrative coherence correlated significantly with
the sense of self-discontinuity. Only autobiographical reasoning
correlated negatively with the sense of self-discontinuity
(Kendall’s τ = −0.358, p < 0.05; Table 4). Thus, in this subsample,
with less experienced change in life since their flight, hypothesis
1b could be confirmed. Figure 1 shows the separate correlations
of autobiographical reasoning with the sense of self-discontinuity
for both subsamples. In the subsample with less experienced
change in life since their flight, autobiographical reasoning
appeared to buffer the sense of self-continuity after forced
displacement (Table 4 and Figure 1). The predicted variance
in this subsample was R2 = 0.15, indicating that the more
autobiographical reasoning these participants displayed in their
life narratives, the higher was their sense of self-continuity.
In contrast, in the subsample of participants who experienced
more change in life since their flight, no significant correlation
between the sense of self-discontinuity and autobiographical
meaning making occurred (Table 5). Figure 1 shows that
autobiographical reasoning in this subsample did not buffer
the negative effect of their forced displacement on their sense

−0.040
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FIGURE 1 | Scatterplot of proportion of autobiographical arguments in life narratives with sense of self-discontinuity by groups of objective change in life since
displacement.

of self-discontinuity (Table 2). Counter to hypothesis 2,
general psychological distress correlated positively with causal–
motivational (Kendall’s τ = 0.304, p < 0.05; Table 2) and by
trend with thematic narrative coherence (Kendall’s τ = 0.185,
p < 0.10; Table 2), autobiographical reasoning (Kendall’s
τ = 0.185, p < 0.10; Table 2), and positive self-event connections
(Kendall’s τ = 0.407, p < 0.05; Table 2). Moreover, less positive
self-event connections went along with greater symptoms
of specific flight-related stress such as with greater memory
intrusion (Kendall’s τ = −0.209, p < 0.10; Table 2), avoidance
of the stressing event (Kendall’s τ = −0.308, p < 0.05; Table 2),
and emotional hyperarousal (Kendall’s τ = −0.248, p < 0.05;
Table 2). Last, emotional hyperarousal correlated positively with
neutral self-event connections (Kendall’s τ = 0.221, p < 0.05;
Table 2). Altogether, greater autobiographical meaning making
appeared to worsen the psychological stress in the refugees, or
greater psychological stress in the refugees reduced the capacity
for autobiographical meaning making, especially for positive
self-event connections.
Looking at the separate subsamples confirms these results
and adds different nuances. While the group with less change
in life also showed by trend a greater sense of self-discontinuity
in relation to greater general psychological distress (Kendall’s
τ = 0.322, p < 0.10; Table 4) and avoidance (Kendall’s τ = 0.442,
p < 0.10; Table 4), autobiographical meaning making barely
correlated with psychological distress (Table 4). Only neutral selfevent connection correlated positively with general psychological
distress (Kendall’s τ = 0.559, p < 0.05; Table 4) and by trend with

of self-continuity. The predicted variance in this subsample
was R2 = 0.03, remarkably lower than in the subsample who
experienced less change in life.
This finding that only those refugees who experienced
less change in life seemed to benefit from autobiographical
meaning making is surprising because it contradicts prior
research (Habermas and Köber, 2015a; Vanderveren et al.,
2020). Therefore, we additionally explored whether the time that
had passed since they fled their home country or the length
of their stay in Germany would shed light on the relation
between autobiographical meaning making and the sense of
self-discontinuity. However, in both subsamples, the sense of selfdiscontinuity did not correlate significantly with the time that
had passed since the flight or with the length of their stay in
Germany. The group with more change in life showed merely
a positive correlation between neutral self-event connections
(Kendall’s τ = 0.379, p < 0.05) and the time passed since the flight.

Autobiographical Meaning Making and
Psychological Distress
Regarding hypothesis 2, correlational analyses in the entire
sample showed that the measures of general (BSI) and specific
psychological distress (IES-R) did not correlate significantly
with objective change in life (Table 2). However, the more
participants felt psychologically distressed, the greater was
their sense of self-discontinuity. Especially, intrusive memories
and emotional hyperarousal related to an increased sense
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−0.018

−0.053

N = 15. BSI, Brief Symptom Inventory measuring general psychological distress; IES, Impact of Event Scale measuring specific (flight-related) psychological distress. **p (one-tailed) < 0.05. *p (one-tailed) < 0.10.

−0.079
0.000
−0.438*
−0.211
−0.285
−0.035
0.087
−0.233
IES–Hyperarousal

0.302

−0.125
0.110

0.078
−0.250

−0.127

−0.246

−0.406*
−0.081

−0.240
−0.355

−0.418*
−0.017

−0.224
0.153

−0.052

−0.229
IES–Avoidance

0.603**
−0.140
IES–Intrusion

0.016

0.169

0.166
−0.100
0.365*
0.097
0.103
0.182
−0.153
BSI–Global Severity Index

0.156

0.364*

0.248

0.152

−0.188
0.069

0.190
0.304

0.010
−0.062

0.147
−0.174

−0.295

0.302

−0.033
0.213

−0.185
−
−
Sense of self-discontinuity

0.107
−
Objective change in life

Negative
Positive
Total

Self-event connections
Autobiographical
reasoning
Thematic
coherence
Causal–motivational
coherence
Temporal
coherence

Inspired by prior research (Habermas and Köber, 2015a), we here
examined whether autobiographical meaning making buffers
the impact of extreme biographical disruptions such as forced
displacement on the sense of self-discontinuity and psychological
distress. Overall, we found a buffering effect only in refugees
who experienced less objective change in life since their forced
migration and an overall trend of autobiographical meaning and
psychological distress to be detrimental to each other. Below we
discuss the main results as well as the limitations of the study.
As evidenced, the more participants felt psychologically
distressed, the greater was their sense of self-discontinuity
(Table 2). This confirms that psychological distress and
the sense of selfhood are interconnected, probably mutually
impairing each other once either psychological well-being or
the sense of self-continuity is disturbed (Chandler et al., 2003;
Rzesnitzek, 2014). The greater sense of self-discontinuity was
specifically related to greater frequencies of intrusive memories
and emotional hyperarousal, corroborating the crucial role
of autobiographical memory for the continuous sense of self
(Conway et al., 2004; Bluck and Liao, 2013) but also for
the maintenance of trauma-related symptoms (Berntsen et al.,
2003; Berntsen, 2009). Yet, results for the entire group showed
no alleviating effect of autobiographical meaning making on
the sense of self-discontinuity or psychological distress. In

Sense of selfdiscontinuity

DISCUSSION

Objective
change in life

TABLE 5 | Kendall’s tau coefficients for relations between objective change in life, the sense of self-discontinuity, autobiographical meaning making, and psychological distress for the group that experienced more
objective change in life.

avoidance (Kendall’s τ = 0.464, p < 0.10; Table 4). Furthermore,
emotional hyperarousal tended to correlate positively with the
total amount of self-event connections (Kendall’s τ = 0.449,
p < 0.10; Table 4) but negatively with positive self-event
connections (Kendall’s τ = −0.568, p < 0.10; Table 4). Overall,
these results indicate that in the subsample with less change
in life, general psychological distress and avoidance of the
stressor tolerate only neutral self-event connections or vice versa.
Further, hyperarousal and positive self-event connections tend to
preclude each other.
The group with more change in life showed a positive
correlation of the sense of self-discontinuity and intrusion
(Kendall’s τ = 0.603, p < 0.05; Table 5), indicating that
intrusive thoughts and the sense of discontinuity maintain
each other in this subsample. Moreover, greater psychological
distress tended to correlate positively with greater causal–
motivational coherence (Kendall’s τ = 0.364, p < 0.10; Table 5)
and more positive self-event connections (Kendall’s τ = 0.365,
p < 0.10; Table 5). Greater intrusion, however, tended to correlate
negatively with thematic coherence (Kendall’s τ = −0.418,
p < 0.10; Table 5) and the total amount of self-event connections
(Kendall’s τ = −0.406, p < 0.10; Table 5). Emotional hyperarousal
tended to correlate negatively with the total amount of self-event
connections (Kendall’s τ = −0.438, p < 0.10; Table 5). Again,
these results indicate that autobiographical meaning making
and psychological distress tend to mutually impair each other,
although less intrusion and less hyperarousal tend to facilitate
greater autobiographical meaning making, or autobiographical
meaning helps to reduce intrusion and hyperarousal.

−0.142

Autobiographical Reasoning in Refugees

Neutral

Camia and Zafar

February 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 618343

Camia and Zafar

Autobiographical Reasoning in Refugees

these refugees managed to maintain a positive self-concept
amid the change or that the change in life revealed positive
self-aspects to them. This positive view on the self seems
to reduce the emotional hyperarousal, while autobiographical
reasoning preserves the sense of self-continuity (Table 4). These
results seem further supported by our finding that these effects
were unrelated to the time gone by since displacement or
the time since their arrival in Germany. Sheer passing of
time did not affect the sense of self-continuity. Rather, if
the change in life was not overwhelming, individuals seemed
to be able to extract autobiographical meaning from extreme
biographical disruptions, buffering their continuous sense of self
and alleviating psychological distress.
For those, however, who experienced greater change in life in
addition to and since their forced displacement, autobiographical
meaning making appeared to be detrimental for the continuous
sense of self and psychological well-being. Very likely, the
several other biographical disruptions such as losses of significant
others, severe health issues, and moves within Germany that
this subsample experienced in addition to their forced migration
nullify the compensating effect of autobiographical meaning
making on the continuous sense of self. Accordingly, we
found causal–motivational coherence and positive self-event
connections to tend to positively correlate with psychological
distress (Table 5). The total amount of self-event connections,
however, and thematic coherence were by trend negatively
correlated to memory intrusion and emotional hyperarousal
(Table 5). In line with other research, these results imply that
autobiographical meaning making is more easily possible and
beneficial if the memory load is emotionally bearable (Rubin
et al., 2008). As long as pre- and/or postdisplacement stressors
maintain psychological distress, the avoidance to remember and
repress autobiographical meaning making can be a strategy to
isolate painful memories in order to continue life and plan the
future amid ongoing stressors (Gemignani, 2011).
Obviously, this study shows several limitations. First of all, we
managed to recruit only a small number of participants because
many were unwilling to talk about their lives and others were
afraid of endangering their asylum claims in Germany when
telling us their life stories. Second, it was impossible for us
to determine the psychological distress and potential trauma
the participants experienced prior to fleeing their country or
individual psychological resources such as resilience. Thus, we
could not determine the individual vulnerability to develop
mental illnesses due to the trauma and extreme stress they go
through (Ullmann et al., 2015; Wildschut et al., 2019). Third,
although all participants were sufficiently fluent to fulfill the
requirements of data collection, testing them in their native
language might have put the participants more at ease when
telling their lives.
Nevertheless, our results replicate and extend prior
research indicating that autobiographical is a potential
means to explain and cope with biographical disruptions,
thereby preserving the sense of self- continuity and
alleviating psychological distress. However, we also found
the nuance that if biographical change is too overwhelming
or still ongoing, or the memory is load emotionally

contrast, we found that the more objective change in life had
happened in the participants’ lives since their displacement,
the less causal–motivational coherent were their life narratives
(Table 2). Furthermore, those with greater general psychological
distress tended to engage in more autobiographical meaning
making, displayed in greater causal–motivational and thematic
coherence, more autobiographical reasoning, and more neutral
self-event connections. On the other hand, greater specific
flight-related psychological stress and a lack of positive selfevent connections tended to mutually sustain each other
(Table 2), supporting prior research (Banks and Salmon, 2013).
Altogether, these results show that refugees were actively
trying to cope in their life narratives with their current
psychological stress, their past, and the experienced change in
life, but the autobiographical meaning making did not yield
a coherent narrative account that provides a continuous sense
of selfhood but instead worsens the psychological distress.
One possible reason is that participants’ meaning making
attempts did not succeed in meaning made, which would
sufficiently reconcile their past with the current life (Park, 2010;
Huang et al., in press) but that their autobiographical meaning
making resembles rather rumination maintaining the current
psychological distress (Lilgendahl et al., 2013; Sales et al., 2013).
Another factor is certainly the extreme stress and the extreme
change in life that refugees experience. Even though prior
research evidences that autobiographical meaning making relates
to a higher sense of self-continuity and well-being when coping
with negative life events (Banks and Salmon, 2013; Habermas
and Köber, 2015a; Merrill et al., 2016; Huang et al., in press;
Vanderveren et al., 2020), in none of these studies individuals
experienced a change in their physical and sociocultural
environment as fundamental as most refugees have. While
all biographical disruptions and specific traumatic events are
challenging for the sense of self and psychological well-being, it is
rare that the relative stability of one’s physical environment, social
relations, and routine activities are threatened simultaneously.
Forced migration, however, involves traumatizing experiences
encountered in the refugees’ home countries and during
displacement, causes the loss of the physical and social
environment, often endangers bodily safety, and demands the
integration into an unknown society often under arduous
bureaucratic, economic, and societal circumstances (Porter and
Haslam, 2005; Ullmann et al., 2015; James et al., 2019). Thus,
forced migration entails several biographical disruptions that
accumulate and protract over the periods of preflight, flight, exile,
and resettlement, which can last several years.
This aspect of protracted stress after the flight was measured
in this study by assessing the objective change in life that
happened since the forced displacement. Remarkably, we
found beneficial effects of autobiographical meaning making
on the sense of self-continuity only in those refugees who
had experienced less change in their lives since their flight.
Because this group had to cope with less postdisplacement
stress, it might have been easier for them to cope narratively
with their forced displacement and their current present. The
significant correlation between objective change in life and
the positive self-event connections (Table 4) suggests that
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provided their written informed consent to participate
in this study.

unbearable, autobiographical meaning making might be
detrimental for the sense of self-continuity and psychological
well-being. This points to both situational factors and individual
differences influencing the benefit of autobiographical meaning
for the sense of selfhood. The individual threshold of how much
change a person can cope with and to what extent it needs
narrative integration of biographical disruptions to make the
future livable remains thus to future research.
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